Richard Bradley: Bayesian Decision TheoryThe tutorials will develop a unified Bayesian decision theory from which the theories of Savage, Jeffrey and others can be derived as special cases. The foundations of the theory lie in an account of rational preference for conditional prospects and the tutorials will cover some essential aspects of the logic and pragmatics of conditionals, before connecting these to role of hypothetical reasoning in decision making. Part of the tutorial will be devoted to a discussion of problems in the foundations of the "classics" (Ramsey, Savage, Jeffrey and Bolker), of which some basic knowledge will be assumed.
- Ramsey, FP 1926 Truth and Probability
- Bradley, R 2004 Ramsey's Representation Theorem, Dialectica, 4:484-97
- Bolker, ED 1967 A Simultaneous Axiomatization of Utility and Subjective Probability, Philosophy of Science, 34(4):333-40
- Bradley, R 2005 Bayesian Decision Theory Unified, LSE Choice Group Working Paper Series
Biographical Note. Richard Bradley is Head of the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics. He works on both individual and collective decision making, conditionals and hypothetical reasoning, and belief and preference revision.